part 2
OTHER "TIME" FACTORS
In the course and scope of employment as a policeOTH officer, supervisor and
manager, the author has had the opportunity to review several hundred officer
involved shooting situations for training, officer safety, administrative use of
force review boards, courtroom presentations and internal discipline.
Following these examinations involving hundreds of investigative hours,
personal experience, evaluation of suspects actions and interviews of
"shooting" police officers, it has been the author's observation that:
1. A suspect armed with a pistol, secreted in his waistband, can draw and
fire at least two shots within 1.0 to 1.5 seconds.
2. Approximately 90% of all officer involved shooting incidents take place
within a three-second-time period.
POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS
As mentioned initially, during post-incident analysis, oftentimes conflicts arise
between an officer's statement and the actual evidence. Please consider the
following additional scenarios and explanations.
1. An officer stated during the officer involved shooting interview he
discharged his firearm in defense of himself when the suspect was facing him.
The forensic evidence indicated however, the bullet track was posterior to
anterior. Under the specific circumstances, perception time, brain lag and
reaction time of the officer, combined with continued movement of the target
(suspect), may have accounted for the inconsistency between the officer's
initial statement and the actual evidence.
2. A suspect believed to be armed with a handgun is chased by a police
officer. The suspect stops, turns to his right and partially faces the officer. The
suspect removes what appears to be a handgun from his waist, extends his
right arm, while turning to his right. He then makes a movement consistent with
assuming a shooting position. The police officer, in pursuit, perceives the threat
(0.1 second), stops, assesses that he is in imminent danger of being shot,
decides on the appropriate use of force and makes the decision to shoot (0.6
to 0.8 or more seconds). At this point, the suspect is continuing to move, turn,
bend, squat, run, climb, throw, stop etc.. In the beat of a heart, the officer
makes the decision to shoot, based upon the belief of imminent threat to life.
He acquires the target, aligns his front and rear sight and squeezes the trigger
twice in rapid succession (1.0 second or more). The suspect falls to the
ground shot in the back. Under the circumstances, the officer's perception of
the threat, decision to shoot plus actual shooting time, required at least 1.0
second or more to implement. During this period of time the officer observed
certain facts and decided on a course of action while the suspect's movement
continued. In closer examination, at the time the officer actually commenced
shooting one would probably find that the suspect was turning back, toward
his left when the bullet(s) impacted . During the post incident, officer interview
however, the officer may have recalled he discharged his weapon while the
suspect was facing him, when in reality, the suspect actually was in the process
of turning away from him.
This discrepancy does not mean the officer was being untruthful at the time of
the interview. Quite the contrary, the physical time lags affecting the officer, his
recall of the suspect's position at the moment he decided to shoot combined
with the continuous movement of the suspect after he started shooting, may
have accounted for the discrepancy between the officer's belief as to the
position of the suspect when he shot and the actual physical evidence. In other
words, the officer's reaction lagged behind the actions of the suspect.
It is also recognized that many factors can affect the above examples; tactics,
positioning, movement of the officer, accuracy and availability of cover, etc..
The point is, the physical time lags (perception time, brain lag and reaction
time) combined with the movement of both officer and target must be equally
considered prior to formulating opinions of what occurred.
As indicated previously, "crisis decisions," i.e., the use of deadly force, require
time (perception, brain lag and reaction time) in order to implement. Just as it
takes time for the police officer to perceive, decide and react to an impending
threat, it also takes time for the officer to perceive, decide and actually stop
his reactive measures. It has been the author's experience to note that criticism
has occasionally arisen regarding an "alleged" excessive number of rounds
being fired by a single "shooting officer".
An officer who is shooting to stop the actions of the suspect is required to
continuously assess the threat throughout the event, and when, in his opinion
the threat is stopped, must "de-escalate" his force. Under these circumstances,
the sequence of de-escalation requires time to implement. It is not unusual to
find that an officer may have attempted to cease fire after 2 to 4 shots
(depending upon the weapon) but, in reality discharged 10 shots or more. In
the final analysis, this alleged "excessive" number of rounds discharged may
not have been excessive at all, and may be attributed to the physical time lags
involved in the officer's deciding to de-escalate response. In short, the officer
may have been unable to immediately discontinue shooting after the initial 2 to
4 shots, due to the perception time, brain lag and reaction time required to
stop the action.
|